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Abstract
Proof-of-work puzzles and CAPTCHAS consume enormous amounts of
energy and time. These techniques are examples of resource burning:
verifiable consumption of resources solely to convey information.
Can these costs be eliminated? It seems unlikely since resource
burning shares similarities with “money burning” and “costly signal-
ing”, which are foundational to game theory, biology, and economics.
Can these costs be reduced? Yes, research shows we can significantly
lower the asymptotic costs of resource burning in many different set-
tings.
In this paper, we survey the literature on resource burning; take
positions based on predictions of how the tool is likely to evolve; and
propose several open problems targeted at the theoretical distributed-
computing research community.
“It’s not about money, it’s about sending a message.”
The Joker [107]
1 Introduction
In 1993, Dwork and Naor proposed using computational puzzles to com-
bat spam email [43]. In the ensuing three decades, resource burning—
verifiable consumption of resources—has become a well-established tool in
distributed security. The resource consumed has broadened to include not
∗This work is supported by the National Science Foundation grants CNS-1318880 and
CCF-1320994.
†This work is supported by the National Science Foundation grant CCF 1613772 and
by a research gift from C Spire.
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just computational power, but also communication capacity, computer mem-
ory, and human effort.
The rise of permissionless systems has coincided with the recent in-
crease in popularity of resource burning. In permissionless systems, any
participant—represented by a virtual identifier (ID) in the system—is free
to join and depart without scrutiny, while enjoying a high degree of anonymity.
For example, an ID might be an IP address, a digital wallet, or a username.
In this setting, security challenges arise from the inability to link an ID to
the corresponding user. A single malicious user may create a large number
of accounts on a social media platform to wield greater influence; or present
itself as multiple clients to disproportionately consume resources provided
by the system; or inject many IDs in a peer-to-peer network to gain control
over routing and content. This malicious behavior is referred to as the Sybil
attack , originally described by Douceur [41].
Such attacks are possible because users are not “ID-bounded” in a per-
missionless system; that is, there is no cost, and therefore no limit, to the
number of IDs that the attacker (adversary) can generate. However, the
adversary is often “resource-bounded”, even if this bound is unknown. In
particular, it may be constrained, for example, in the number of machines it
controls, or total channel capacity to which it has access. Resource burning
leverages this constraint, forcing IDs to prove their distinct provenance by
producing work that no single attacker can perform.
Paper Overview. Resource burning is a critical tool for defending per-
missionless systems. In support of this claim, we survey an assortment
of topics: distributed ledgers, application-layer distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks, review spam, and secure distributed hash tables (DHTs).
Using these examples, we highlight how results in these different areas have
converged upon resource burning as a critical ingredient for achieving secu-
rity; this is summarized in Table 1.
As prelude to this survey, we predict how resource-burning may evolve,
and how systems may adapt to this technique. These predictions are distilled
in four position statements below.
Position 1: Resource burning is a fundamental tool for
defending permissionless systems.
PoW and CAPTCHAs have been around now for decades, persisting de-
spite concerns over scalability, resource consumption, security guarantees,
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Domain
Primary
Resource
Consumed
Mechanism
Enabled
Functionality
Conjectured Cost
Blockchains CPU CPU Puzzles Distributed Ledger O(
√
TJG + JG)
DHTs CPU CPU Puzzles
Decentralized
storage and search
O˜(
√
TJG + JG)
DDoS
Attacks
Bandwidth
/ CPU
Messages /
CPU Puzzles
Fair allocation of
server resources
No Conjecture
Review
Spam
Human
Time
CAPTCHAS
Trusted consumer
recommendations
O˜(T 2/3 + PG)
Table 1: Summary of the domains surveyed, along with the corresponding
resources, and core functionality that is secured by resource burning. We
also make conjectures on the algorithmic spend rate. Here, T is the adver-
sary’s spend rate; JG is the join rate for good IDs; and PG is the posting rate
of good IDs. We elaborate on these notions in Section 2.5. The O˜ notation
omits polylogarithmic factors.
and predicted obsolescence (see discussion under Position 2 and Section 3).
The continued practical success of resource burning aligns with theoretical
justification from game-theoretic results on “money-burning” and “costly
signaling”(Section 2.1). Given the increasing popularity of permissionless
systems, and the need to defend them, resource burning will likely only
increase in prevalence.
Position 2: Resource burning must be optimized.
In May 2020, the annual energy consumption of Bitcoin was 57.92 terawatt-
hours of electricity per year, which is comparable to the annual electricity
consumption of Bangladesh; Ethereum was 7.9 terawatt-hours, comparable
to that of Angola [39]. In 2012, humans spent an estimated 150, 000 hours
per day solving CAPTCHAS [114, 137]. The rise of permissionless systems
will likely only increase these rates of resource burning.
On the positive side, recent theoretical results suggest that resource
burning can be analyzed and optimized just like any other computational
resource [59,61]. But there is significant work needed to: (1) develop a the-
ory of resource burning focused on distributed security; and to (2) translate
this theory into practical resource savings.
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In this paper, we discuss current theoretical work on reducing resource-
burning rates across multiple application: blockchains (Section 3); DHTs
(Section 4); application-layer DDoS attacks (Section 5); and review spam
(Section 6).
Position 3: Reducing from permissionless to permis-
sioned systems is important.
Four decades of research have resulted in efficient and reliable algorithms for
permissioned networks. We should leverage these results when addressing
problems in new permissionless systems. One way to do this is to develop
tools, based on resource burning, that bound the fraction of IDs controlled
by the adversary (bad IDs) in permissionless systems. In Sections 3, we
discuss results on the problem GenID, which provides this bound for static,
permissionless networks; and DefID which does so for permissionless net-
works with churn.
In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the threats posed by application-layer
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and review spam. Neither problem aligns
perfectly with a permissionless model. For example, servers are under ad-
ministrative control, and online review systems often require credentials for
account creation. However, these systems still remain vulnerable to mali-
cious participants that are difficult to identify, and who monopolize system
resources. We define a hybrid system model as one that contains both per-
missioned and permissionless properties. We note that any tools designed
for permissionless systems will also work for hybrid systems. However, we
would expect to be able to develop more efficient techniques to adapt tools
from permissioned systems to these hybrid systems.
Position 4: Theoretical guarantees should hold inde-
pendently of the resource burned. Research should fo-
cus on both domain-specific and domain-generic prob-
lems.
As theoreticians, we should generalize as much as possible. Algorithms
that use resource burning should require a certain “cost” that specifies the
amount of the resource to be consumed, but should allow for that resource
to be anything: computation, computer memory, bandwidth, human effort,
or some other resource yet to be defined. As much as possible, theoretical
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results should be stated in terms of this cost, irrespective of the resource
consumed. This ensures our theoretical results will continue to be relevant,
even as underlying technologies providing verifiable resource burning may
change.
Additionally, a key research focus should be on problems that gen-
eralize across multiple domains. In this paper, we describe two exam-
ples: GenID and DefID (Section 3.1). Our remaining three examples
are domain-specific. We believe it is important to work on both types of
problems.
2 Background and Preliminaries
Resource burning has found application in various areas of computer se-
curity; indeed, its use was proposed by Douceur [41] as a defense against
the Sybil attack [40, 75, 100, 106]. However, resource burning has a broader
history, with similar ideas appearing in several other scientific domains.
In Section 2.1, we present this background. In Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4,
we elaborate on the notion of resource burning. Finally, in Section 2.5, we
describe a general problem model that provides a unifying set of assumptions
and terminology used throughout this document.
2.1 Game Theory, Biology and Economics
Resource burning is analogous to what is referred to as money burning in the
game theory literature. To the best of our knowledge, the first significant al-
gorithmic game theory study of money burning, due to Hartline and Rough-
garden, analyzed the use of money burning in mechanism design [61]. Their
main result is a near-optimal mechanism for multi-unit auctions, where the
quantity optimized is social welfare or the sum of utilities of all players.
They also give results showing that, under certain conditions, an auction
utilizing money burning can obtain a Ω
(
1
1+log(n/k)
)
fraction of the optimal
social welfare, where the auction consists of n bidders who are bidding for
k units. They conclude that “the cost of implementing money-burning ... is
relatively modest, provided an optimal money-burning mechanism is used”.
Money burning is also known as costly signaling in the game theory
literature, and it has two main uses in this context. First, it can signal com-
mitment to a certain action, as is illustrated in the “lunch” game1 [29, 68].
Second, it can signal the “type” of a player, as is in the“college” game [29].
We present these two games below.
1This is equivalent to what is referred to as the “battle of the sexes” game in [29]
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Lunch Game. Two friends want to eat lunch together, but the first friend
prefers option A and the second prefers option B. They each obtain payoff
of −1 if they choose different locations. If they both pick option A, they
obtain payoffs of 10 and 1 respectively. Conversely, if they both pick option
B, they obtain payoffs of 1 and 10.
Now, if the first friend verifiably burns money equal to 1 unit of utility
prior to playing the game, this signals a commitment to their preferred
option, since if they were to choose the unpreferable option, their utility
would now be at most 0. Thus, they would not have played the game. In
this way, a friend who burns money can expect higher utility.
College Game. Each student is one of two types: smart or daft. Each
student is considering college and can choose either the action attend or not
attend. A smart student pays a cost of 1 (in terms of time and effort) to
attend college, and a daft student pays a cost of 3 to attend college. We
assume that the decision of the student to attend college is publicly known,
but that otherwise, college has no impact: daft students stay daft even after
attending.2
An employer wants to hire smart students. If the employer hires a smart
student, their benefit is 2, and if they hire a daft student, their cost is 2. If
a student is hired by the employer, they have a benefit of 2, and if they are
not hired, they have a benefit of 0.
It is easy to verify that the following is a Nash equilibrium for this game:
◦ Smart students attend college.
◦ Daft students do not attend college.
◦ The employer hires only students that attend college.
Here, smart students all choose to attend, even though college has no
intrinsic benefit. Thus, the choice to attend college is a costly signal made
by the smart students, and college itself is an example of resource burning.
If the option to attend college were removed from the game, and the
fraction of smart students were less than 1/2, then a Nash equilibrium would
be for the employer to never hire. In this case, the overall social welfare—the
sum of expected benefits to all players—would decrease.
Biology. Costly signaling is a well-known phenomena in biology. A relevant
example from animal behavior is stotting, in which quadrupeds, such as deer
and gazelles, repeatedly jump high into the air. This is often done in view of
2On the positive side, smart students stay smart!
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a predator, suggesting that stotting is a costly signal to the predator that the
prey is too healthy to catch [49]. Other examples occur in sexual-selection,
where the use of plumage, large antlers, and loud cries are a costly signal of
fitness [156].
Economics. In 1912, the economist Thostein Veblen coined the term “con-
spicuous consumption” to describe costly signaling used by people to adver-
tise both wealth and leisure. For example, Veblen writes, “The walking stick
serves the purpose of an advertisement that the bearer’s hands are employed
otherwise than in useful effort, and it therefore has utility as an evidence of
leisure” [134]. Decades of economic studies suggest that conspicuous con-
sumption is a critical part of historical and modern economies [98,113,118,
121,131]. For example, Sundie et al write: “Although showy spending is often
perceived as wasteful, frivolous, and even narcissistic, an evolutionary per-
spective suggests that blatant displays of resources may serve an important
function, namely, as a communication strategy designed to gain reproductive
reward” [131].
2.2 What is Resource Burning?
We define resource burning as the verifiable consumption of a resource.
In particular, it is computationally easy to verify both the consumption of
the resource, and also the ID that consumed the resource [6]. Below we
describe several resource-burning techniques.
Proof-of-work (PoW). PoW is arguably the current, best-known example
of resource burning. Here, the resource is computational power. Proof-of-
work has been proposed for spam-prevention [43, 85, 90]; blockchains [103];
and defense against Sybil attacks [10,88].
CAPTCHAs. A completely automated public Turing test to tell computers
and humans apart, or a CAPTCHA, is a resource-burning tool where the
resource is human effort [148]. CAPTCHAs may be based around text,
images, or audio; however, several design and usability issues exist [147].
Proof-of-Space. Proof-of-space requires a prover to demonstrate utiliza-
tion of a certain amount of storage space [1, 13, 42, 44]. This approach is
foundational for Spacemint cryptocurrency [111]. Like PoW, proof of space
demonstrates the consumption of a certain amount of a physical resource,
but can require less electrical power. A related proposal is “Proof of Space-
Time” [102], which demands proof of consumption of a certain amount of
storage space for a certain amount of time.
Resource Testing. Resource testing requires a prover to demonstrate
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utilization of a radio channel [55,56,101].3 Consider a wireless setting where
each device has a single radio that provides access to one of several channels.
Thus, an adversary representing two bad IDs, but with a single device,
can only listen to one channel at a time. A base station can assign each
ID to separate channels; send a random message on one of these channels
chosen randomly; and demand that the message be echoed back by the
corresponding ID. Since the adversary can only listen to a one channel at a
time, it will fail this test with probability at least 1/2.
2.3 What is not Resource Burning
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is a defense for permissionless systems, wherein
security relies on the adversary holding a minority stake in an abstract finite
resource [2]. It has been proposed primarily for cryptocurrency systems
(Section 3). When making a group decision, PoS ensures that each ID has
voting weight proportional to the amount of cryptocurrency that ID holds.
Well-known examples of such systems are ALGORAND [54], which employs
PoS to form a committee, and Ouroboros [83], which elects leaders with
probability proportional to their stake. Hybrid approaches using both PoW
and PoS exist, including one proposed for the Ethereum system [8], and
under the name “Proof of Activity” [27]. In contrast to the above examples,
PoS involves a measurement, rather than a consumption of, a resource.
Disadvantages of Proof-of-Stake. Unfortunately, PoS can only be used
in systems where the “stake” of each ID is globally known. Thus, it seems
likely to remain relevant primarily in the domain of cryptocurrencies. More-
over, even within that community, there are concerns about proof-of-stake.
To quote researcher Dahlia Malkhi: “I think proof-of-stake is fundamentally
vulnerable . . . In my opinion, it’s giving power to people who have lots of
money” [35].
2.4 Resource Burning Does Not Require Waste of the Resource
While resource burning requires verifiable consumption of a resource, it does
not necessarily require waste of that resource. For example, Von Ahn et
al. [137] developed the reCAPTCHA system which channeled human effort
from solving CAPTCHAs into the problem of deciphering scanned words
that could not be recognized by computer. Their system achieved an ac-
curacy exceeding professional human transcribers, and was responsible for
sucesssfully transcribing hundreds of millions of words from public domain
books.
3Resource burning refers to the game-theoretic money burning technique; resource
testing refers to that technique specifically applied in the wireless domain.
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In 2018, Ball et al. developed proof-of-work puzzles whose hardness is
based on worst-case assumptions [25]. These puzzles are based on the Or-
thogonal Vectors, 3SUM, and All-Pairs Shortest Path problems, and any
problem that reduces to these problems, including deciding any graph prop-
erty statable in first-order logic. Hence, their work enables design of PoW
puzzles that can be useful for solving computational problems of practical
importance.
In [126], Shoker developed proof-of-work puzzles that solve real-world
matrix-based scientific computation problems. He named this technique
“Proof of Exercise”.
All algorithms discussed in this paper are compatible with this type of
“useful” resource burning, where the consumption of the resource solves
practical problems. Our only requirement of the resource burning mecha-
nism is that the consumption of the resource be easily verifiable, which holds
true for the above results.
2.5 A General Model
We discuss broad aspects of a general model for permissionless systems. This
allows us to highlight commonalities between different application domains,
while retaining the same terminology throughout.
The system consists of virtual identifiers (IDs). An ID is good if it
obeys protocol and belongs to a unique user; otherwise, the ID is bad . Good
and bad IDs cannot necessarily be distinguished a priori.
Communication. Communication is synchronous and occurs either via
point-to-point or via a broadcast primitive. The former is typical for peer-
to-peer systems and the general client-server setting. The latter corresponds
to permissionless blockchains, where it is a standard assumption that a good
ID may send a value to all other good IDs within a known and bounded
amount of time, despite an adversary; for examples, see [30, 52, 54, 92] and
see [97] for empirical justification.
Adversary. A single adversary controls all bad IDs; this pessimistically
represents perfect collusion and coordination by malicious users. Bad IDs
may arbitrarily deviate from our protocol, including sending incorrect or
spurious messages. The adversary can send messages to any ID at will, and
can view any communications sent by good IDs before sending its own. It
knows when good IDs join and depart, but it does not know in advance the
private random bits generated by any good ID.
Often, the adversary is assumed to control only an α-fraction of the
network resources, for α > 0. Generally, in settings where correctness is
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threatened, α must be a small constant; for example, often bounded below
1/3 or 1/4. Alternatively, there are settings where α can be any constant
bounded away from 1; typically, this corresponds to problems of performance
(rather than correctness).
Tunable Costs. We measure cost as the amount of resource consumed.
Our model is agnostic with respect to the particular resource used. However,
we assume that it is possible to arbitrarily tune the cost. In particular, we
assume that, for any value x, an ID can be issued a challenge of difficulty
x that will require consumption of x units of whatever resource is used.
Resources such as computation, computer memory, and bandwidth have
inherently tunable costs. For CAPTCHAs, cost could be adjusted in two
possible ways. First, by adjusting the difficulty of the puzzle, by either (1)
adjusting the number of alphanumeric digits or the number of images to be
classified; or (2) adjusting the difficulty of an individual recognition task as
described in the ScatterType CAPTCHA system [24]. Second, by adjusting
the expected difficulty by adjusting a probability of being required to solve
a CAPTCHA.
Joins and Departures. Often, the system is dynamic, with IDs joining or
departing over time. There is no a priori method for determining whether a
joining ID is good or bad. Joins and departures by bad IDs may be scheduled
in a worst-case fashion, and pessimistically we often assume the adversary
also has a limited ability to schedule these events for good IDs. We will
generally assume a lower bound on the number of IDs in the system, and
that the lifetime of the system is polynomial in this lower bound.
Key Notation. Through out this work, let T denote the adversarial
spending rate , which is the cost to the adversary over the system life-
time divided by the lifetime of the system. Let the algorithmic spending
rate , A, be the cost to all good IDs over the system lifetime divided by the
lifetime of the system.
In the blockchain and DHT problems, we let JG denote the good ID
join rate , which is the number of good IDs that join during the system
lifetime divided by the lifetime of the system. Finally, for the review spam
problem, we let PG denote the good posting rate , which is the number of
posts made by good IDs during the system lifetime divided by lifetime of
the system.
2.6 Game Theoretic Analysis
For many of our problems, we can analyze the defense of a system as a
two-player zero sum game [45] as follows. There is an adversary that can
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choose to attack or not, and an algorithm that can choose to defend or not.
There is a system invariant, which the algorithm seeks to protect, that has
some value V . There is a function f that gives the cost incurred when the
algorithm chooses to defend as follows: if the adversary spends T to attack,
then the algorithm will spend f(T ) to defend. Thus the payoff matrix for
the algorithm is given below.
Adversary
Attack ¬Attack
Algorithm
Defend T − f(T ) −f(0)
¬Defend −V 0
Solving this game, we get that in the Nash equilibrium, the algorithm
player will defend with probability p = VT−f(T )+f(0)+V . Thus, the expected
utility of the game to the algorithm player will be −V f(0)T−f(T )+f(0)+V . In many
of our problems, f(T ) = f(0) + o(T ), and so we obtain a value that is
Θ
(
−V f(0)
T+V
)
. Smaller T optimizes the utility for the adversary, in which
case, the expected utility of the algorithm is Θ(−f(0)).
3 Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies
A blockchain is a distributed ledger. In particular, it is a distributed data
structure that stores transactions between IDs in a network. Each transac-
tion represents flow of a resource from one ID to another. Every transaction
added must be legitimate, in the sense that the source ID owns the resource
to be transferred, as indicated by the distributed ledger, at the time of the
transaction. Importantly, transactions can only be added to the blockchain,
and once added, can never be deleted or edited.
3.1 GenID and DefID
Perhaps the current, most frequently-used application of resource-burning
is for blockchains. Permissionless blockchains are vulnerable to Sybil at-
tacks [89]. The next two problems use resource burning to defend against
this. Recall that the adversary controls an α-fraction of the resource that is
being burned.
The GenID Problem. The problem stated below, GenID, was first de-
fined and studied by Aspnes, Jackson, and Krishnamurthy [11]. They pro-
posed a solution with latency of 3 rounds, and O˜(n2) bits sent per good ID,
at a burned resource cost of O(1) per good ID.
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Open Problem 1. GenID
Model: Initial set of IDs; n of which are good, with the rest are
controlled by an adversary.
Goal: All good IDs decide on a set of IDs S such that: (1) all good
IDs are in S; and (2) at most a O(α) fraction of the IDs in S are
adversarial.
Several other solutions to GenID have been proposed in the literature [4,
10, 67, 81]. Andrychowicz and Dziembowski described an algorithm with a
latency of Θ(n) rounds; O˜(n2) bits sent per good ID; and a burned resource
cost of O˜(1) per good ID [10]. Concurrent to this work, Katz, Miller and Shi
[81] proposed another solution with similar costs. Hao et al. [67] improved
on these results via using a randomized leader election protocol. Their
algorithm has, in expectation, a latency of Θ
(
lnn
ln lnn
)
rounds; O˜(n) bits sent
per good ID; and a burned resource cost of Θ
(
lnn
ln lnn
)
per good ID.
The most recent work in this domain is by Aggarwal et al. [4], which
requires in expectation: O(1) latency; O(n) bits sent per good ID; and a
burned resource cost of O(1) per good ID.
It is still not known if these costs can be reduced for the general problem,
or for an “almost-everywhere” versions of the problem, where all but a o(1)
fraction of the IDs must learn S. To the best of our knowledge, there are
no current lower-bounds on the problem.
The DefID Problem. The following problem, called DefID, considers
the GenID problem in the presence of churn.
Open Problem 2. DefID
Model: Stream of IDs joining and leaving a network.
Goal: At most an O(α)-fraction of bad IDs in the network at any
time.
A first algorithm to solve DefID was proposed in by Gupta, Saia and
Young in [58]. It required algorithmic spend rate of O(JG + T ); recall
that JG is the join rate of good IDs per time step, and T is the spend
rate of the adversary. Note that this result holds without any additional
assumptions. Gupta, Saia and Young further improved this result in [59,60]
to O(JG+
√
TJG), subject to two assumptions on the join rate of good IDs,
which are found to be supported by real-world data [59].
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Specifically, the assumptions needed are as follows. Define an epoch to
be the length of time it takes for the fraction of good IDs to change by 3/4
fraction. First, the join rate for good IDs changes by at most a multiplicative
factor between any two successive epochs. Second, in any epoch the actual
join rate for good IDs over any “sufficiently large” period of time is within
constant factors of the join rate for good IDs over the entire epoch.
An asymptotically matching lower bound was obtained for a large class
of algorithms [59]. An open problem is to generalize this bound to all algo-
rithms.
4 Distributed Hash Tables
Distributed hash tables (DHTs) are a popular P2P distributed data struc-
ture [3, 80, 87, 96, 117, 129] with several implementations over the years [46,
128, 141]. Generally, the design entails hashing attributes of a user’s ma-
chine to a key value (or ID) in a virtual space; similarly, for data items. The
various DHT constructions differ in their overlay topologies, but typically
IDs need only maintain state on a small number of neighbors, and routing
is possible with a small number of messages, where small means at most
logarithmic in the number of IDs in the system.
These systems are vulnerable to attack. A bad ID that participates in
routing can drop or corrupt any message it receives. A good ID can be
completely isolated from the rest of the network if all of its neighbors are
bad; this is often referred to as an eclipse attack [63,127]. Finally, content
can be compromised if bad IDs alone are responsible for storing a particular
data item. Generally, the behavior of bad IDs is modeled by Byzantine
faults. For almost two decades, there has been a sustained interest in the
design of secure DHTs that can tolerate such attacks [135].
Byzantine Fault Tolerance in DHTs. A popular approach to tolerating
bad IDs depends makes use of groups: these are small sets of IDs, each
of which have a good majority. Intuitively, a group is used in place of an
individual peer, and the group members act by using majority action or
secure multiparty computation to coordinate actions. For example, routing
can be performed robustly via all-to-all communication between each pair of
groups along the path from source to destination. Examples of group-based
DHT constructions include [21–23,48,72,105,122,125,151].
As an alternative to using groups, bad IDs may be tolerated by employ-
ing some form of redundant routing [32, 65, 74, 78, 82, 104]. Several other
results do not explicitly apply to DHTs, although they may be compat-
ible. For example, the challenge of tolerating bad IDs is exacerbated in
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highly-dynamic P2P systems, and there is a growing body of work in this
area [14–18, 57]. Self-healing networks are another approach for achieving
security, where bad IDs are identified and evicted [84,119,120].
In all of these works, a critical assumption is that the fraction of bad
IDs is a small constant. However, given that DHTs are often permissionless,
this assumption is easily violated via a Sybil attack. Thus, while many tools
have been developed for securing DHTs against Byzantine faults, additional
work is required to limit the fraction of bad IDs in the permissionless setting.
Sybil Resistance. Several approaches have been proposed for mitigating
the Sybil attack. The influence of bad IDs can be limited via containment
schemes that leverage the network topology in structured overlays [124]
and in social networks [7, 86, 99, 143, 152–154]. However, the information
required—particularly social networks—may not always be available.
An alternative defense is to use measurements of communication latency
or wireless signal strength to verify the uniqueness of IDs [26,38,53,91,140].
However, these techniques are sensitive to measurement accuracy.
For DHTs, an early result by Danezis et al. [37] gives a heuristic to limit
the impact of bad IDs using bootstrapping information, but unfortunately
provides no formal guarantees. Results that employ resource burning are
scarce. The use of computational puzzles in decentralized systems is ex-
plored by Borisov [31] and Tegeler and Fu [132] as a means for identifying
and excluding bad IDs from the system. Computational puzzles are also used
by Rowaihy et al. [116] to throttle the rate of bad IDs added to a structured
P2P system; however, this does not limit their number. Arguably the best-
known result is the SybilControl scheme by Li et al. [88], which provides
for a DHT construction that limits the number of bad IDs through the use
of computational puzzles. Good IDs periodically challenge their neighbors
under the Chord DHT topology [129, 130], and blacklist those who do not
respond with a solution in time. Experimental results indicate that this
approach, in conjunction with limited data replication, allows for almost all
searches to succeed.
4.1 Why DefID is Not Enough
The DefID problem (Section 3.1) captures many of the challenges required
for secure DHTs. However, current solutions to DefID depend heavily on
a means to coordinate resource burning. The main approach is to use a
committee—a small set of IDs with a good majority—which issue resource-
burning challenges. To apply results on DefID to DHTs requires decentral-
izing the functionality provided by the committee.
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Additionally, while DefID always guarantees a minority of bad IDs,
this is not enough. In particular, to ensure reliable routing and protection
from eclipse attacks, group-based approaches demand that all groups have
a minority of bad IDs. Fortunately, there are already clever techniques to
spread the bad IDs uniformly across the groups. Informally, when a new ID
joins a group, some IDs in the group are evicted and resettled in random
locations, and their replacements are selected uniformly at random [21–23,
57].
Unfortunately, performing such shuffling for every joining ID, even when
there are no bad IDs in the system, incurs large bandwidth costs. A major
open problem is to devise an algorithm that minimizes both bandwidth and
resource-burning costs, as a function of adversarial spend rate.
Open Problem 3. A Secure DHT in the Permissionless Set-
ting
Model: The adversary has complete control over the scheduling of
joins and departures for bad IDs and limited control for good IDs.
There is no explicit assumption that the good IDs are in the majority
at all times.
Goal: A DHT that enables secure and efficient routing between any
two good IDs in the system.
4.2 The Permissionless DHT Problem
Problem 3 gives our formal problem in this domain. It assumes that the
adversary controls an α < 1/3 fraction of the burnable resource. We now
describe some ideas about how to solve it.
Recall from Section 3.1 that DefID imposes a cost of O(JG+
√
TJG) on
the good IDs. Informally, a plausible extension to this result is for each group
in the DHT to act as a committee that runs an algorithm to solve DefID. In
many group-based constructions, a good ID belongs to a number of groups
that is logarithmic in the system size. Consequently, the algorithmic spend
rate is likely to increase by a logarithmic factor. This yields our conjectured
bound of O˜(
√
TJG + JG). Note that this aligns with Position 2 since costs
to the good IDs are low when the adversary expends little effort (or does
not attack at all), and grows slowly relative to the adversary’s cost when
a significant attack occurs. In the absence of a single committee that can
track global information (such as the join rate of IDs), setting the hardness
of challenges is tricky, and new ideas are needed to obtain the conjectured
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upper bound.
Finally, while we have focused on DHTs, new defenses for them might
generalize to providing security in permissionless settings for other struc-
tured P2P systems [12,20,47,51,62,71,158].
5 Application-Layer DDoS Attacks
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack prevents good IDs from accessing resources
of a system. A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack occurs when
multiple bad IDs carry out a coordinated DoS attack. In an application-layer
DDoS attacks, an adversary attacks by issuing many requests for system
resources, as opposed to say swamping the network bandwidth. Here, we
discuss defenses against application-layer DDoS attacks based on resource
burning.
Filtering Methods. Many DDoS defenses rely on techniques for filtering
out malicious traffic, including IP profiling [94,155]; CAPTCHAs [109,136];
capability-based schemes [9,149]4; and anomaly detection [70]. An extensive
survey of defenses can be found in [157]. Unfortunately, these techniques
are imperfect, and an adversary may bypass them by issuing traffic that
appears legitimate. This has led to resource-burning defenses against DDoS
attacks, which are sometimes referred to in the literature as currency-based
or resource-based schemes [139].
Resource-Burning Approaches. A number of proposed defenses require
IDs to solve puzzles before their requests for service are honored [19,76,77,
112]. A challenging aspect of these proposals is the lack of a theoretically-
backed method to tune the puzzle difficulty. To address this issue, Mankins
et al. [95] propose a pricing mechanism to set the difficulty based on the
service-request type; however, the pricing functions are set by the server a
priori, and may fail as the incentives or capabilities of the attacker change
over time. A dynamic strategy to determine puzzle difficulty is given by
Wang and Reiter [142]. A client requesting service chooses the puzzle diffi-
culty based on the effort it is willing to expend, while the server prioritizes
service according to the difficulty of the puzzles solved. However, this ap-
proach may starve IDs with limited resources, and requires the server to
maintain state on the difficulty of the puzzles solved. Finally, Noureddine
et al. [108] employ a game-theoretic model to pre-compute the difficulty of
puzzles assuming all IDs (good and bad) are rational.
4Informally, this refers to a scheme where the source makes a “capability” request and,
if approved by the receiver, will then obtain prioritized service from those routers along
the path between the source and the receiver.
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An alternative resource—communication capacity—is consumed by the
speak-up defense of Walfish et al. [138]. During an attack, it is common for
bad IDs to bombard the server with requests, using much (or all) of the data
rate available to the adversary. Speak-up encourages good IDs to respond in
kind by increasing their respective request rates. A front-end server known
as a “thinner” randomly drops requests in order to impose a manageable
service load. If the aggregate capacity of the good IDs is comparable to that
of the bad IDs, then this resource-burning scheme can allow good IDs to
obtain a commensurate amount of service.
5.1 The Application-Layer DDoS Problem
There are many similarities between the application-layer DDoS attack and
the Sybil attack. The DDoS model is not purely permissionless, since the
server is a trusted authority. However, the attacks involve IDs whose dis-
tinctness cannot be ascertained, and where an adversary may create many
bad IDs to facilitate attacks. In this sense, the DDoS model is a hybrid
of permissionless and permissioned systems. Thus, it is not surprising that
resource burning would be useful to defend against DDoS attacks.
In this vein, we propose the open problem below.
Open Problem 4. Application-Layer DDoS Attacks
Model: There are n good client IDs and a good server. An adversary
controls an α-fraction of the consumable resource, and can generate
any number of bad client IDs. Client IDs can request service from the
server at any time. The server must decide which requests to service
based on its own limited resources.
Goal: The good clients obtain a 1 − O(α) fraction of the service
provided by the server.
Problem 4 shares much in common with DefID (Section 3.1). Requests
from client IDs correspond to join events; satisfying requests corresponds
to departures. Here, α need not be bounded, since we are not making a
correctness guarantee analogous to maintaining a good majority in DefID.
Rather, our new requirement concerns performance: good IDs receive a
1 − O(α) fraction of service. In this sense, Problem 3 seems strictly easier
than DefID.
However, a new difficulty is heterogeneity: requests may differ in the
amount of effort required to service them. Thus, enforcing a bound on the
fraction of bad requests serviced does not ensure that the goal of Problem 4
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will be met. In light of this issue, it may be helpful to consider a weighted
version of DefID, and whether existing solutions can be extended to this
more general setting. While we are optimistic that for large T , o(T ) is
possible for Problem 4, a tight upper bound is an interesting direction for
future work.
6 Review Spam
Online user-generated reviews play an important role in influencing the pur-
chasing decisions of consumers. These systems are subject to manipulation
where an adversary employs multiple accounts to create fake reviews that
falsely promote or disparage a product [50]; this malicious behavior is often
referred to as review spam , but also goes by other labels such as astroturf-
ing [133] and opinion spam [69].
Review spam threatens online retailers—such as Amazon or Walmart [33,
50]—and merchants who depend on income from online sales. While online
review systems typically have some form of admission control, such as re-
quiring credentials for the creation of an account, this can be bypassed. For
example, an attacker can hire users that possess a sufficient online presence
in order to engage in review spam [36,66], and social-media credentials can
be automatically generated [133]; examples of these attacks are described
in [69,93].
In response to this threat, the research community has proposed various
strategies for detecting fraudulent reviews; these employ a range of tech-
niques including machine learning [34,73], anomaly detection [123,145,146],
linguistic evaluation [79,115], graph analysis [5,28,66], and many others. A
comprehensive overview of these techniques is given in [64,144,150].
Progress in this area offers the ability to classify a review as either spam
or legitimate, with some small error probability; for example, the work
in [110] achieve an accuracy of almost 90%. This classification functional-
ity is a promising ingredient for designing more general tools for mitigating
review spam.
6.1 The Review Spam Problem
The problem of review spam largely aligns with our general model in Sec-
tion 2.5. While online systems often require some credentials for creating
an account, this admission control can be circumvented, and the system is
effectively permissionless. However, the review spam model has some novel
features. IDs join the system, but they may never formally depart. Even
IDs that are regularly in use may have periods where the corresponding user
is offline. Thus, any attempt to simultaneously challenge all IDs, in order
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to reveal some as bad, will fail.
On the positive side, as noted above, machine learning can now help.
In particular, we may assume a classifier that correctly classifies reviews as
spam or not with some fixed probability of error. Over a sufficiently large
number of reviews, this classifier can be used to obtain a good approximation
of the current fraction of spam reviews, and this information can be used to
set the amount of resource burning required to post a review. Our conjecture
of O(T 2/3+PG) in Table 1 follows from a preliminary analysis that leverages
a classifier in this way. Informally, we increase the cost for posting a review
when a significant attack is ongoing—that is, many reviews are diagnosed
as spam by the classifier. Otherwise, we reset the cost to the lowest level.
We formalize the challenge of review spam as Problem 5.
Open Problem 5. Review Spam
Model: IDs post reviews online. A classifier labels each post as
legitimate or as spam, with some fixed error probability. Each spam
post has unit cost, reflecting its negative impact on system usability.
The algorithm can also set an arbitrary resource-burning cost for each
new post, based on the classification of past posts.
Goal: Minimize costs due to spam posts plus resource-burning costs
incurred from legitimate posts.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we surveyed the literature on resource burning and established
it as critical a tool for securing permissionless systems. We described results
from four domains: blockchains, DHTs, application-layer distributed DDoS
attacks, and review spam. We noted shared security vulnerabilities in both
permissionless and hybrid systems, and how resource burning is well-suited
for addressing common threats.
We observed that resource burning costs are prohibitively high for most
current systems. Thus, a high-priority area for theoretical research is the
design of resource-burning defenses that reduce these costs. In particular,
whenever possible, good IDs should spend at a rate which is asymptotically
less than the adversary when the system is under attack. To encourage
research efforts, we defined several open problems, along with conjectured
upper bounds for these problems.
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